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Abstract—Fine-grained disabling and reconfiguration of hard-
ware elements (functional units, cache blocks) will become eco-
nomically necessary to recover from permanent failures, whose
rate is expected to increase dramatically in the near future.
This fine-grained disabling will lead to degraded performance
as compared to a fault-free execution.
Until recently, all static worst-case execution time (WCET)
estimations methods were assuming fault-free processors, re-
sulting in unsafe estimates in the presence of faults. The first
static WCET estimation technique dealing with the presence
of permanent faults in instruction caches was proposed in [1].
This study probabilistically quantified the impact of permanent
faults on WCET estimates. It demonstrated that the probabilistic
WCET (pWCET) estimates of tasks increase rapidly with the
probability of faults as compared to fault-free WCET estimates.
In this paper, we show that very simple reliability mechanisms
allow mitigating the impact of faulty cache blocks on pWCETs.
Two mechanisms, that make part of the cache resilient to faults
are analyzed. Experiments show that the gain in pWCET for
these two mechanisms are on average 48% and 40% as compared
to an architecture with no reliability mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety-critical systems require that their deadlines are met
in all execution situations, including the worst-case. This proof
needs an estimation of the worst-case execution time (WCET)
of any sequential task in the system. WCET estimation meth-
ods [2] have to be safe and tight at the same time. Safety
is the guarantee that estimated WCETs are greater than or
equal to any possible execution time. Tightness means that the
estimated WCET is as close as possible to the actual WCET
(which in general is unknown). Static WCET estimation meth-
ods are known to provide safe WCET estimates if conservative
information on the timing of instructions is available.
A common implicit assumption in a large majority of
static WCET estimation techniques is that the hardware is
not subject to faults. However, technology scaling, used to
increase performance, has the negative consequence of provid-
ing less reliable silicon primitives due to static and dynamic
variations [3]. This results in an increase of the probability
of failure (pfail) of circuits. The resilience roadmap published
in [4] underlines the magnitude of the problem we will very
soon face. According to [4], the increase of pfail with scaling
will be particularly significant for SRAM cells, for which
the predicted pfail is 6.1 × 10−13 at 45nm and will increase
to 2.6 × 10−04 at 12nm. Furthermore, when using dynamic
voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS), SRAM cells may begin
to fail if the voltage is reduced too much. In [5] the predicted
pfail for 32nm technology is 1 × 10−3 at 0.5V. Existing
techniques defined to deal with process and latent defects
and provide fault-free chips at current technology nodes, like
column/row sparing and error correcting codes (ECC), will not
be affordable anymore in the future due to their non-scalable
cost when used extensively to recover from permanent faults.
Consequently, other approaches like fine-grained disabling
and reconfiguration (e.g. of individual functional units or
cache blocks) will become economically necessary. We are
going to enter a new era: functionally correct chips with
variable performance among a population of chips, and with
varying performance over time resulting from aging. A recent
study [6] has analyzed the effect of fine-grained disabling
resulting from permanent faults on average performance. It
reveals that caches, which take most of the die real-estate in
current processors and contain numerous SRAM cells, will
be a non-negligible source of performance degradation in the
near future. Therefore, assuming fault-free chips in WCET
estimation methods may lead to an underestimation of the
WCET, even when using static analysis methods.
In a previous study [1], we have proposed a static probabilis-
tic method to estimate the impact of permanent faults in cache
blocks on worst-case execution times. The proposed method
statically estimates the worst-case path in programs using
static analysis, its probabilistic nature only stemming from
the probabilistic nature of cell failure. Derived probabilistic
WCETs (pWCETs in the following) can be used to ensure
that timing constraints are met under a targeted probability
depending on the software criticality level (e.g. 10−15 per task
activation for the commercial aerospace industry [7]).
The experimental evaluation of [1] allowed to quantify
the impact of permanent faults on pWCETs. For a given
probability of cell failure (e.g. 10−4), it was observed that
the pWCET estimates are significantly higher than fault-free
WCET estimates. There is thus a need to mitigate the impact
of faults to significantly reduce pWCET estimates. An in depth
observation reveals that when the targeted probability is very
low (e.g. 10−15) some sets are considered as entirely faulty.
This leads to a significant degradation of pWCET estimates,
because spatial locality in faulty sets is not captured anymore.
In this paper, we show that simple reliability mechanisms
allow to eliminate this situation. This additional hardware
allows to obtain pWCET estimates that are much lower than
in [1], and in some situations identical to those of a fault-free
architecture. More precisely, the contributions of this paper are
the following:
• Probabilistic WCET estimation techniques accounting for
permanently faulty cache blocks for two reliability mech-
anisms. The two mechanisms differ by their hardware
cost and impact on estimated pWCETs, to allow the
hardware designer to find the best pWCET/cost tradeoff;
• An experimental evaluation of the impact of the con-
sidered reliability mechanisms on estimated pWCETs.
Experimental results show that the gain in pWCET for the
two mechanisms are on average 48% and 40% as com-
pared to an architecture with no reliability mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
fault model and the base probabilistic fault-aware WCET
estimation technique are presented in Section II. Section III
describes the two reliability mechanisms to support faulty
cache blocks, and presents the corresponding pWCET estima-
tion. Experimental results are given in Section IV. Section V
surveys related work. Conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we present the considered architecture and
fault model. We also detail the used state-of-the-art WCET
estimation technique. Finally, we give an overview of our
previous work on probabilistic WCET estimation for faulty
instruction caches [1] that will serve as a base in this paper.
A. Architecture and fault model
The analysis is defined for set-associative instruction caches
implementing the Least Recently Used (LRU) replacement
policy. A cache configuration is defined by a number of sets
S, a number of ways per set W , and a block size in bits K.
For the scope of the paper, a single level of instruction cache
is assumed.
The study assumes that permanent faults manifest only in
the instruction cache. The extension of this work to other
processor structures is subject of other ongoing effort.
A cache block with at least one bit affected by a permanent
fault is considered as faulty and is disabled. Furthermore,
LRU-stack bits and control bits are assumed to be fault free.
Faulty cache blocks are assumed to be detected using post-
manufacturing and boot-time tests, ECC, and built-in self-tests,
and are disabled when detected as faulty. The exact position of
the faulty blocks in each set has no importance, thanks to LRU
replacement: in case of block failure, the size of the LRU stack
of a set is reduced by its number of faulty blocks. Each SRAM
cell (bit) is assumed to have an equal probability of failure
pfail to be permanently faulty. The locations of permanently
faulty SRAM cells are considered as random. This allows to
account for major causes of uncorrelated faults [8].
Based on the above assumptions, with K the block size
in bits, the probability of a cache block failure pbf can be
determined from the probability of bit failure pfail as follows:
pbf = 1− (1− pfail)K (1)
The probability pwf (w) to have exactly w faulty ways
among W in a set can be derived by using the binomial
probability law:
pwf (w) =
(
W
w
)
(pbf )
w(1− pbf )W−w (2)
When reliability mechanisms will be introduced in Sec-
tion III, the faults concerning hardened blocks will be masked.
In the following, the term faulty block will denote a block af-
fected by a fault and not covered by the reliability mechanisms.
B. Static WCET estimation technique
Static WCET estimation techniques consist of a low-level
analysis to analyze the timing of instructions, and a high-level
analysis to identify the longest execution path. The state-of-
the-art techniques we use are presented below. Since our focus
is on the impact of permanent faults on instruction caches,
the description of the low-level analysis only focuses on that
hardware component.
1) Instruction cache analysis: The contribution of instruc-
tion caches to the WCET is determined by statically asso-
ciating a Cache Hit/Miss Classification (CHMC) for every
memory reference. The CHMC defines for each reference its
worst-case behavior with respect to the instruction cache (e.g.
the CHMC is set to always-hit only when it is guaranteed the
reference will always result in a cache hit, regardless of the
execution path followed at run-time).
CHMCs are obtained by applying the static analysis tech-
nique described in [9], based on abstract interpretation. Three
analyses that operate on the program control flow graph are
defined. The Must analysis determines if a memory block
is always present in the cache at a given program point:
if so, the reference CHMC is always-hit. The Persistence
analysis determines if a memory block will not be evicted
after it has been loaded; the CHMC of such references is
first-miss. Finally, the May analysis determines if a reference
to a memory block may be in the cache at a given point: if
not, the reference CHMC is always-miss. Otherwise, if present
neither in the Must analysis nor in the Persistence analysis the
reference CHMC is not classified.
Each analysis computes an Abstract Cache State (ACS) at
every program point until a fixpoint is reached. The semantics
of abstract cache states depends on the considered analysis.
All of them maintain for each cache block an age in the LRU
stack (the smallest age is the block in the Most Recently Used
- MRU position, the highest age is the Least Recently Used
block). For the Must and Persistence analyses, the age of a
block in an ACS is the maximum possible age the block could
have in the cache at run-time.
2) High-level analysis: WCET calculation uses the most
prevalent technique, named IPET for Implicit Path Enu-
meration Technique. IPET is based on an Integer Linear
Programming (ILP) formulation of the WCET calculation
problem [10]. It reflects the program structure and the pos-
sible execution flows using a set of linear constraints. Such
constraints express that each basic block must be entered the
same number of times as it is exited (structural constraints),
or indicate the maximal number of times a basic block can be
executed inside loops (loop bound constraints).
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Fig. 1. (a) Fault miss map (FMM). (b) Example of computation of the distribution of fault-induced miss penalties for the first two sets.
C. Probabilistic fault-aware WCET estimation
The technique described in [1] computes, for a given
program, cache configuration, and probability of SRAM cell
failure, a WCET probability distribution, representing the
WCET estimate probability among a population of chips. In
order to avoid an exhaustive computation of WCETs for all
combinations of fault locations, the approach operates in two
steps. It first computes the fault-free (non probabilistic) WCET
as described in section II-B. Then, it determines an upper
bound of the probability distribution of the time penalties
caused by fault-induced misses. The WCET probability distri-
bution is then obtained by adding these two components.
The penalty probability distribution is computed based on
a Fault Miss Map (FMM). In this map (Figure 1.a), each
row corresponds to a set and each column corresponds to a
number of faulty blocks in the set. Each FMM element gives
an upper bound of the number of fault-induced misses per set
and per number of faulty blocks. For example, in the FMM of
Figure 1.a, we know that a single faulty block in set 0 results
in at most 10 additional cache misses. The FMM is computed
by solving for each set s and each number of faulty blocks f
an ILP system close to IPET (see [1] for details).
The penalty distribution is computed for each cache set
independently, by studying the respective impact of f ∈ [1,W ]
faults. The distribution is composed of at most W+1 different
penalties that correspond to 0 up to W faulty blocks with
the probability for each case given by pwf (equation 2).
Since sets are independent, all these discrete distributions are
independent. Thus, they are combined by computing the prod-
uct (convolution) of their probability distributions to obtain
an upper bound of the penalty distribution, as illustrated in
Figure 1.b. In the figure, the penalty probability distribution
of set 0 and set 1 have 3 distinct points corresponding to
0, 1 and 2 faulty blocks, with their associated probability to
occur pwf (0), pwf (1) and pwf (2). These two distributions are
then combined by convolution to obtain the penalty probability
distribution of set 0 + 1.
III. PROBABILISTIC WCET ESTIMATION IN PRESENCE OF
RELIABLE HARDWARE
In this section we first present two independent reliability
mechanisms, whose objective is to mitigate the impact of
permanent faults on probabilistic WCET (pWCET) estimates.
Then, we show how pWCETs are estimated in the presence
of such reliability mechanisms.
A. Hardware to support faulty cache blocks
1) Reliable way (RW): The first hardware modification,
named RW in the following, is to have one fixed way per
set (for example way 0) resilient to permanent faults [11],
[12]. Figure 2.a gives an illustration of a cache with the
RW mechanism. The idea behind this mechanism is to cope
with the situations when entire sets are faulty. Without this
mechanism, a significant increase of fault-induced misses
would arise, because the spatial locality of references would
not be captured. With the added hardware, the spatial locality
is always captured regardless of faults, as well as a part of
temporal locality of references. Making one way in the cache
resilient to faults ensures that the performance will be at worst
the one of a direct-mapped cache of size S.
2) Shared Reliable buffer (SRB): The second hardware
extension is the addition of a small shared buffer (same size as
a L1 cache block), named SRB designed such that it is resilient
to permanent faults (see Figure 2.b).
In contrast to the RW, the cache look-up mechanism is
modified. When a given address is referenced, the memory
block is searched for into the SRB only when all blocks in
the concerned set are faulty; in case of a miss in the SRB,
the missing memory block is loaded into the SRB. If the
corresponding set has at least one non-faulty cache block, the
SRB is not used and the cache look-up is done as usual.
Similarly to the RW, the idea of the SRB is to avoid the
drastic increase of cache misses occurring when all cache
blocks in a set are faulty, but with a comparatively lower
hardware cost. However, compared to the RW, the SRB may
result in worse performance in the presence of faults, because
the size of the reliable memory is lower than for the RW.
(b) Shared Reliable Buffer (SRB) 
SRB: used when 
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S sets 
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Fig. 2. Hardware to mask faulty cache blocks
Moreover, the RW is more likely to benefit from temporal
locality than the SRB.
B. Probabilistic WCET estimation with the RW and SRB
1) RW pWCET estimation: The RW ensures that at most
W − 1 ways are faulty. A fault may affect the reliable way
with a probability pbf as defined before, but should this be
the case, the fault will be masked. Thus, when computing the
penalty distribution of a set, W − 1 ways only have to be
considered and the fault-induced misses when all blocks are
faulty can be safely ignored.
Formally, equation 2 is modified as follows:
pwf (w) =
(
W − 1
w
)
(pbf )
w(1− pbf )W−1−w (3)
Intuitively, the RW allows to remove from the penalty
distribution of each set, the point corresponding to W faulty
blocks, leading to the highest penalty. For instance, the penalty
of set 0 in Figure 1.b will have only two points instead of three:
one with a penalty of 0 and one with a penalty of 10.
2) SRB pWCET estimation: When using the SRB, fault-
induced misses in the MRU position can still occur since the
SRB is shared by all sets and thus is mainly able to preserve
the spatial locality.
The analysis of a cache with a SRB requires a modification
of the computation of the FMM to remove all the fault-induced
misses that are for sure eliminated by the SRB. To do so, a
cache analysis of the SRB is performed as if the SRB was the
only cache in the system. This allows to capture the spatial
locality of references within the SRB. Then, when computing
an upper bound of fault-induced misses when all blocks are
faulty in a set, the references classified as always-hit in the
SRB can be safely removed. The penalty distribution is finally
computed as before. Intuitively, the SRB mechanism allows
to remove most (but not all) of the fault-induced misses in
the rightmost column of the FMM. Thus, the point with the
highest penalty in the penalty distribution of each set will be
significantly reduced.
Remark that our analysis conservatively assumes that no
information is kept in the SRB between distinct series of
successive accesses to the SRB. For example, in the reference
stream a1a2b1b2a1a2, if addresses ai and bi are mapped to
distinct sets, the cache analysis of the SRB will classify all
occurrences of a2 and b2 as always-hit. The second occurrence
of a1 will conservatively be classified as not classified because
there is a non-null probability that the SRB is reloaded when
referencing b1 in case the corresponding set is faulty. The
definition of a more precise analysis deriving the probability
that a block stays in the SRB is left for future work.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experimental setup
The experiments were conducted on 25 benchmarks from
the Ma¨lardalen WCET benchmark suite [13]. The instruction
cache size is fixed to 1KB. The cache and memory latencies
are fixed to 1 cycle and 100 cycles respectively. The cache
configuration is fixed to a 4-ways set-associative cache with
LRU replacement and with 16B cache lines. This configuration
is the one leading to the smallest pWCET in [1].
The experiments were conducted on MIPS R2000/R3000
binary code compiled with gcc 4.1 with no optimization and
the default linker memory layout. Fault-free task WCETs are
computed by the Heptane static WCET estimation tool [14],
that implements the cache analysis and WCET computa-
tion steps as presented in Section II-B. The experimental
results presented hereafter only account for the contribution
of instruction caches to the WCET. The effects of other
architectural features (data cache, pipeline, branch predictor)
are not considered. Cache Hit/Miss Classification not classified
is considered equivalent to always-miss. Cplex 12.5 is used to
solve the different ILP systems.
The probability of bit failure pfail is fixed to 10−4 which is
representative of the highest assumed probability of cell failure
in related work [4], [7]. That pfail value helps identify the
different behaviors that can be observed in our experiments.
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Fig. 3. Complementary cumulative distribution with the SRB, the RW and no
protection for benchmark adpcm, for pfail = 10−4.
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Fig. 4. pWCET estimates for a fault-free architecture, an architecture with the SRB and an architecture with the RW, all normalized against the pWCET on
a system with no protection. The targeted probability is set to 10−15 (pfail = 10−4).
The analyses provide complementary cumulative distribu-
tion functions, as illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts the
pWCET of benchmark adpcm for the different levels of
protection (no protection, RW and SRB). The three curves are
exceedance functions indicating for a given targeted probabil-
ity p (e.g. 10−15 per task activation for aerospace commercial
industry [7]) the value at which the random variable WCET
will be equal to, or below that value, with probability 1− p.
For brevity the results in the following will be presented
by depicting only the pWCET estimates obtained when the
targeted probability is set to 10−15 instead of giving the
complete complementary cumulative distribution.
B. Experimental results
Figure 4 reports the pWCET estimates for three config-
urations: a fault-free architecture, an architecture with the
RW and an architecture with the SRB. Values are normalized
with respect to the pWCET estimated without any protection
mechanism. The benefit of the SRB mechanism is highlighted
by the top part of the stacked histogram, while for the RW the
benefit is observed by cumulating the benefit of the SRB and
the contribution of the SRB (see the illustration on matmult at
the right of the figure). In Figure 4, benchmarks having similar
behavior are grouped together.
In the figure, we can observe that for all benchmarks, using
the SRB or the RW results in significantly lower pWCETs
compared to an architecture with no protection. For the SRB,
the minimum gain is 25% for benchmark ud and 40% on
average. The gain for the RW is as expected larger than or
equal to the gain with the SRB, with a minimum gain of 26%
for benchmark fft and an average gain of 48%.
A deeper analysis of the results, for all benchmarks, reveals
that the benchmarks can be classified in four different cate-
gories, depicted in Figure 4 from left to right, depending on
the locality captured by the cache.
For the first category, the estimated pWCET for both the
RW and the SRB is equal to the fault-free WCET. It means
that the impact of faults is fully masked by the protection
mechanisms. This is explained by the fact that the cache,
because of the applications’ characteristics, is able to capture
the spatial locality only, which is fully preserved by the two
mechanisms.
For the second category, the estimated pWCET for the RW
is equal to the fault-free WCET but not the pWCET for the
SRB. For these benchmarks, the cache is able to capture only
the spatial and temporal locality in the MRU position. Since
the SRB analysis is not able to preserve the temporal locality
in the MRU position, this explains why the gain of the SRB
is reduced as compared to the RW.
The third category shows a similar gain for both mecha-
nisms. This is explained by the fact that most of the temporal
locality captured by the cache is not covered by the MRU
position and thus cannot be protected by the protection mech-
anisms.
The fourth and last category mixes the behaviors of the two
previous categories: (i) the temporal locality captured by the
MRU position and (ii) the temporal locality captured by the
rest of the cache. This explains the difference between the
two proposed mechanisms and between them and the fault-
free WCET.
The different impact of the two mechanisms on pWCETs
is expected since the SRB mainly captures spatial locality and
our analysis of the SRB is conservative. In contrast, the RW
better takes benefit of the temporal locality, but has a higher
hardware cost. As shown in Figure 4, the tradeoff between the
two protection mechanisms does not only depend on the extra
hardware cost but also on the applications characteristics.
V. RELATED WORK
WCET estimation techniques may use either static analysis
or measurements to derive WCET bounds [2]. Our method
falls into the first category, which by construction provides safe
WCET estimates. Moreover, produced WCET estimates may
be either deterministic (calculate a strict upper bound that is
never exceeded at run-time) or probabilistic (calculate several
worst-case execution times with associated probabilities of
occurrence). The method we propose in this paper can be
classified as static probabilistic timing analysis (SPTA). The
use of static analysis guarantees the longest execution path is
detected; the method produces probabilistic WCET bounds to
reflect the probabilistic nature of faults.
Many static timing analysis methods for systems equipped
with cache memories (instruction caches, data caches, cache
hierarchies, with various cache structures and replacement
policies) have been proposed in the past [9], [15], [16], [17]. To
the best of our knowledge, all of them, except [1] assume fault-
free caches. The added contribution of this paper as compared
to [1] is to add cost-effective hardware to improve the pWCET
estimates in the presence of faults.
The impact of faults on software timing was studied in a
series of research papers [6], [18], [7]. Paper [6] addresses
the impact of permanent faults and disabling of resources on
application performance for non real-time applications. They
concentrate on average-case performance instead of worst-
case performance, and do not propose any additional hardware
to limit the impact of faults on performance. A method to
statically compute probabilistic WCETs in the presence of
faults is presented in [18]. In contrast to our work, [18]
focuses on faulty sensors, whereas we focus on faulty SRAM
cells in instruction caches. The objective of [7] is to derive
WCET estimates in the presence of permanent faults and
disabling of hardware elements. The difference lies in the
type of method used to obtain WCETs and in the processor
architecture considered. Regarding WCET estimation, [7] uses
a measurement-based probabilistic timing analysis method and
as such is not guaranteed to identify the longest execution path,
whereas we use static probabilistic timing analysis (SPTA).
Previous studies have proposed new hardware to limit the
impact of permanent faults on performance. A reliable victim
cache (RVC) is proposed in [19]; it allows replacing faulty
cache lines with supplementary cache lines from the victim
cache. The authors of [19] evaluate the impact of the RVC
on WCETs using cycle-accurate simulation along the already
known worst-case execution path; in contrast to our work,
they do not provide means to identify the longest execution
path. Cost-effective approaches consisting of a spectrum of
cell sizes are proposed in [11], [20] to limit the impact of
failures occurring at low voltage in caches, in architectures
using dynamic voltage/frequency scaling. In contrast to our
work, the focus in [11], [20] is on average-case performance.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed in this paper a pWCET analysis for two
reliability mechanisms (SRB and RW) that limit the impact of
permanently faulty cache blocks on worst-case performance.
As future work, a more precise pWCET estimation technique
for the SRB could be devised to limit the conservatism of
the proposed technique. Other directions are to transpose the
hardware and corresponding analyses to data caches, and to
perform an extensive analysis of the impact of the proposed
mechanisms on die area and power consumption.
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